PUERTO RICO'S STATUS DEBATE

Author: Amy Thornbury

CHAPTER ONE

The Background:
Puerto Rico's Political Climate
and Relationship with the U. S.


Yukiyu's visitors politely pointed out that only Puerto Rico had no
animal king or representative. . . . So a committee suggested four
candidates:

The Lamb: "Better the master you know than the one you don't."
The Chameleon: "I promise you work and a car and a house for
everybody, if you vote for me."
The Hummingbird: "We must feed our people to strengthen their legs,
their hearts, and their minds, so that they can stand on their own
two feet. . . . It is I who suck the honey from the flowers to give to
the people.'
The Coqui: difficult to see but easy to hear, this is the "voice of
conscience," the true Puertorriqueño.
-- Eduardo Ordoñez, Yukiyu (El Espiritu de Borinquen)

The U. S.-Puerto Rico political relationship has been characterized by ambiguity, ignorance, and hypocrisy. As historian Whitney Perkins terms it, a "policy of no policy" has been followed. Thus, Puerto Ricans are apt to feel that it is not the United States which suffers from the inexperience of Puerto Rico in governing itself, but rather, Puerto Rico which suffers from the inexperience of the United States in governing others. The official U. S. stance, established by President Truman in 1948, is that Puerto Rico has the right to self-determination; while at the same time, the people of Puerto Rico have historically been unable to reach a majority consensus on their future status. In sum, the situation lends itself to a stalemate. The lead quotation gives an idea of the different threads of consciousness which dominate and complicate Puerto Rican politics.
The "self-determination" stance of the U. S. is quite ironic. In the interest of promoting democracy and self-rule, there is no other policy that the U. S. could follow: it cannot (ethically) force a particular status upon an unwilling people. But many have pointed out that the U. S. has not permitted Puerto Rico to determine its status alone: there have been at least three major attempts to improve the present Commonwealth status (in 1953, 1959, and 1975) which came to naught because they met with opposition in the U. S. government. Another problem with "self-determination" is that the people of Puerto Rico cannot choose a status alternative without knowing beforehand under what conditions the U. S. is willing to accept each option. For example, a large majority of the Puerto Ricans could endorse a status whereby they would become a quasi-independent nation with their own international identity and management of foreign affairs, but would retain all the economic benefits and military protection gained from the U. S. While such an arrangement would be popular among Puerto Ricans, the U. S. would have little to gain and would most likely reject it.
* * *
Congress has had an unfortunate history of treating Puerto Rico with less than its due respect. The islanders have frequently been viewed as docile, indolent inferiors who should be thankful for the benevolent treatment given them. Thus, matters concerning Puerto Rico have frequently been pushed aside in Congress for other, more "urgent" needs. Granted, there were several badly timed occasions on which Congress and Puerto Rico began to make progress on the status question, only to have the discussion preempted by war or economic depression. Nonetheless, the prejudices which ran rampant in Congress before the 1960s, as manifested in the reluctance to pass civil rights laws and the self-important attitude of the nation in the post-war boom, must be taken into consideration. Even the fact that the U. S. military felt it could change the name of the island to "Porto Rico" in 1899 implies a sense of superiority over the native Puerto Ricans. Historian Truman Clark mentions the "hilarity" with which Congress approached changing the name back to its correct spelling, Puerto Rico, in 1932. Perhaps this is an isolated instance of a particularly "jovial" Congress; however, a theme of congressional lethargy on Puerto Rican issues persists. For instance, the Jones Act (1917), which granted Puerto Rico a greater degree of self-rule and U. S. citizenship, was passed eleven years after Theodore Roosevelt's first request for extending greater privileges and citizenship to the Puerto Rican people. Another example is the Elective Governor Act (1947) , which gave Puerto Ricans the right to elect their own governor, instead of having one appointed for them by the U. S. president. First proposed in 1928, it did not become a reality for 19 years.
The basis of the justification for U. S. involvement in Puerto Rico goes back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In broad terms, this document decried European influence in the Western hemisphere. By the 1860s, however, the Monroe Doctrine had become a "convenient cloak" for U. S. intervention in Latin America and the carving up of northern Mexico into Texas, New Mexico, and California. What had started out as a gesture opposing European interference "had been turned into a ruthless axiom that was utilized by the United States to suit the interests of 'Yankee Imperialism.'" While the Monroe Doctrine has no legal basis, it was widely accepted by U. S. policymakers in the 19th century as the core of U. S. policy towards Latin America.
If Congress's attitude toward Puerto Rico has been ambiguous and haphazard, then Puerto Ricans in turn have viewed Congress as an ambivalent body, as indicated by the following quotation : "A wise Puerto Rican . . . [said] that if the islanders were to ask Congress for Independence, Congress would feel hurt but would probably grant it; but if Puerto Rico asked for Statehood, Congress would feel flattered and would probably reject it." The situation in the 1930s demonstrated this sentiment in practice, when the Puerto Rico's petition for admission as a state was answered by Congress two years later with an offer of independence from the U. S.
Estadistas (statehooders) have traditionally responded to Congress's deaf ear on Puerto Rico's plight by pointing out that as a state, Puerto Rico would have representatives in Washington to voice the island's concerns, and second that if Congress continues to ignore their statehood demands, they will support independence. The latter has been a frequently-used threat, employed in 1912, 1932, and 1978, for example. Estadistas would throw their support to the independentistas (independence supporters) only as a last resort, however, as they would like to retain close association with the U. S. The statehood parties' affiliation with the National Republican Party since 1903 (except for an interlude from 1916 to 1919) suggests this desire for association with the mainland.
The largest percentage of votes which a statehood party has ever received is 48.3%, recorded in the 1976 elections for the Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party), founded in 1968 by industrialist Luis A. Ferré. This percentage should be compared with the highest mark for the party which dominated Puerto Rican politics for almost 30 years, thePartido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party), favoring Commonwealth status, from 1940 to 1968, which was about 65%, but usually hovered closer to 60%. No party since the late 1940s has achieved an overwhelming or decisive majority. These thin electoral margins help explain the status stalemate.
Recently, the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) has consistently won the urban vote. The island's capital, San Juan, represents 12.5% of the total vote -- a very substantial part of the electorate. San Juan has continuously voted for the PNP since the party's first appearance on the ballot in 1968. The other metropolitan areas in Puerto Rico are also PNP strongholds. This hints at the constituency of the PNP. Historically, it attracted the upper class, landed interests. Since the mid-1960s, however, the pro-statehood electorate has extended into the new urban middle class. The middle class must be carefully defined, though, as consumers with newly discovered buying power which they are afraid of losing. To them, the PNP represents ". . . greater personal security, the wonders and the moral worth of the traditional family, the need for unity and sacrifice, and the like."
The Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), on the other hand, was formed in 1938 by Luis Muñoz Marín, in part from the mobilization of the rural masses: the jíbaro, or Puerto Rican peasant, who constituted nearly three-quarters of the island's population at that time. Its early electoral support included the sugar-cane interests, the industrial workers, rural professionals, and intellectuals. Today, the party has the allegiance of the middle income group (which is different from the middle class). Muñoz rallied support at the end of the Great Depression with the party slogan, "Pan, Tierra, y Libertad," meaning "Bread, Land, and Liberty," and the PPD dominated Puerto Rican politics from 1940 to 1968. Muñoz served as governor of the island from 1940 until 1964, wielding tremendous influence on the mainland as well as the island and pushing through the island's status change to Commonwealth in 1952. Muñoz is considered one of the greatest caudillos and is among the most important political figures in Puerto Rico's history.
The third major political group is the pro-independence sector. Since 1946, this group has been represented by the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (Puerto Rican Independence Party). The PPD held independence as an acceptable status option until 1946, at which time Muñoz declared that it was no longer a goal of his party. Hence, the pro-independence faction of the party split off and formed the Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (PIP). Before then, the most purist independentistas belonged to the Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party), which was founded in 1922 by Pedro Albizu Campos. Albizu was a radical proponent of independence at any cost. His policy is best summarized by his statement that "in order for the strong to hear the weak, you have to open his ears with gunshots." His followers abstained from all elections because they believed that elections under colonial rule were a farce: Puerto Rico could not legitimately decide anything for itself until it achieved independence, since "dissenting intellectuals" would be stifled by the colonial force. The Nationalist Party disappeared in 1950s, but its ideology lives on in the smaller, more radical pro-independence groups. The PIP reached a highwater mark in 1952 when it polled 19.6% of the total vote. Today, its followers are estimated to be about 10% of the island's total population.
Underlying all three positions on Puerto Rico's status are a few common traits. As a whole, Puerto Rican politics are quite different from stateside politics. According to historian Raymond Carr,

Puerto Rico is a city-state, torn as were city-states in antiquity and in Renaissance
Italy by the feuds of political clans, feuds fostered by the intimacy of a small society
and fueled by the status question. . . . Status politics, Muñoz Marín concluded at the end
of his life, had sapped the political energies of Puerto Rico, diverting them from the
real problems of the island.
This passage reiterates an earlier statement that every political question in Puerto Rico is essentially a question of status. The Puerto Rican people have grown weary of rehashing the same old questions; yet 80% of all registered voters continue to participate in elections, which gives Puerto Rico a very high voter-turnout rate. However, corruption can and has played a role in attaining this percentage. Puerto Rican elections are infamous for the existence of "graveyard" votes and the paid vote. Evidence of the high degree of voter involvement in Puerto Rican politics are the symbols which are displayed outside homes to proclaim and promote the individual's party alignment. PNP supporters hang the party emblem, the Royal Palm, in blue, while PPD supporters use the traditional peasant hat, or pava, in deep red. The emblems are large and mass produced on sheets of metal.
A crucial element of Puerto Rican politics is their highly personalized nature. Charisma is probably the most important quality in a successful politician anywhere, but this trait is especially significant to Puerto Rican voters. Caudillos, or charismatic leaders, can call all of the shots in this political game. Scandal, fraud, and corruption are other, less euphemistic, names of the game. The very existence of political parties have depended upon charismatic leaders: quite often, if the leader dies, so does the party . This factor makes for very bitter power struggles in Puerto Rican politics, struggles which are often completely counter-productive. For example, in the upcoming 1988 elections, the PNP was split over which of its two predominant leaders, Baltasar Corrada del Río or Carlos Romeró Barceló, should run for governor on the PNP ticket. Apter long months of acrimonious debate, it was decided that Corrada del Río would run, although the party's chances of winning suffered from the power struggle. Indeed, it is conceivable that personalist politics have contributed to the failure of status resolutions: for instance, if there were not so many "Muñozistas " (staunch PPD supporters who felt they "owed" Muñoz their vote) in the early 1970s, it seems that the PNP would have been likely to gain substantially higher electoral margins than it did.
Robert Anderson, political analyst and professor at the University of Puerto Rico, describes Puerto Rican politics in the context of Latin American politics:

Dogmatic, ideology-based parties with broad, continuing bases of support and stable
organization have been rare in Latin America. In Puerto Rico political parties
have typically been nonideological, vague of program, and willing to work within the
existing system. . . . The only politically articulate 'ideologies' in Puerto Rico have
grown out of the status issue, but even these have often been held with something
less than consistent zeal.
If ideologies often fail to generate fanatic appeal, a profound sense of patriotism for Puerto Rico succeeds. In this regard, Puerto Rico is somewhat similar to Texas; most Puerto Ricans consider themselves Puerto Rican first, and American second. Even Puerto Ricans who live stateside remain loyal to Puerto Rico and their Hispanic heritage, as witnessed by the low turnout (unusual for Puerto Ricans) of eligible Puerto Rican voters in the U. S. For example, only a third of all eligible Puerto Rican voters residing in New York City are registered to vote; of these, typically just five percent actually exercise their voting rights. That they consider themselves more Puerto Rican than American was confirmed by a survey conducted in New York City in 1980, which revealed that 75% did not consider themselves American.
Important to keep in mind is the underlying trait of bitterness which runs through Puerto Rican politics. In 1936, one Puerto Rican businessman wrote that the 38 years of unresolved status "has been a constant source of irritation, friction, confusion and uncertainty which has adversely affected our normal development." In 1948, it was described by Juan José Osuna, the most respected Puerto Rican educator of his generation, as follows: "In the absence of a clearcut policy for Puerto Rico, fifty years of political uncertainty, unrest and emotional uproar, have contributed to the development of a very unhealthy colonial mind among many of the inhabitants of the Island." Again, the recurring complaint among Puerto Ricans is of colonial treatment. What does the U. S. Constitution say about colonies and the guidelines for territorial acquisition? Are the Puerto Ricans justified in their complaints?
* * *
Constitutional and Legal Characteristics
"If ambiguity is a virtue, then Puerto Rico is a most virtuous society," wrote Anderson in 1965. This statement expounds upon an earlier one that the U. S. has consistently followed a "policy of no policy" with regard to Puerto Rico. While this may be a rather accurate generalization, it is helpful to examine the specific constitutional and legal underpinnings in the U. S.-Puerto Rico relationship.
Until 1934, Puerto Rico was the official responsibility of the U. S. War Department. That responsibility was then transferred to the Department of the Interior, with the Secretary of the Interior in charge. Since the early 1960s, by decree of President John F. Kennedy, the island has been the responsibility of the White House. Various task forces have been assigned to handle Puerto Rican affairs, usually with little effect. The Interior and Insular Affairs Committee is the congressional body responsible for Puerto Rico at present.
The island, officially a Commonwealth since 1952, can be and has been called a "possession" or a colony of the U. S. Actually, the U. S. Supreme Court invented the convenient term "unincorporated territory" to describe Puerto Rico in 1901, ruling that Puerto Rico belonged to but was not a part of the U. S. The court has twice ruled (in 1922 and 1980) that Puerto Rico is "only" a territory, subject to Congressional rule. It has also determined that U. S. citizens in Puerto Rico can be treated differently from U. S. citizens living within a state. The Court's decisions were handed down in the so-called Insular Cases of 1901-1922 which challenged the Foraker Act, the act which in 1900 determined Puerto Rico's form of government and relationship with the U. S. First, the Court ruled that the U. S. could treat Puerto Rico differently from other territories of the past by not incorporating it. Unincorporated territories, then, were subject to the decisions of Congress in all matters concerning their status, citizenship, Bill of Rights, and taxes. "The vigorously disputed principle that the Constitution could be extended to the territories, in whole or in part, at the discretion of Congress, was validated by the Court." The "vigorous disputing," incidentally, occurred in Congress between the Republicans who were not in favor of extending the Constitution, and the Democrats, who were in favor of it. Terming the territory "unincorporated" was convenient because it meant that the U. S. could postpone a final decision of the island's status and could do with it what it pleased in the meantime, whereas an incorporated territory cannot legally be denied admission as a state. Even so, incorporated territories underwent an average of almost 21 years before they were granted statehood.
What, exactly, does the U. S. oversee and enforce in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico? The following is an incomplete, but representative, list: eminent domain; defense and military service; tariffs; foreign commerce and relations; currency; shipping; immigration and emigration; maritime limits and coast guard; treaties; and patents. Furthermore, all federal laws apply to Puerto Rico except those which are specifically exempted. This policy was established in the 1952 Federal Relations Act, sec. 58. Most revealing, the Constitutional Convention which gave birth to Commonwealth status in 1952 recognized Puerto Rico as part of the U. S. political system, "in a manner compatible with the federal structure." The preamble of the Puerto Rican Constitution includes the important and much-debated wording calling the relationship between the island and the mainland a "union" rather than an "association." Thus, while technically a separate Commonwealth, Puerto Rico is not an international entity but remains within the realm of U. S. domestic policy. As such, it qualifies as a colony because many of the island's most important affairs are decided by the U. S. Congress.
Legislators who granted U. S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans in 1917 left an ambiguous gap in the island's status. How could Puerto Ricans have U. S. citizenship but still be regarded as "not a part of" the U. S.? More specifically, the ironic situation is established whereby U. S. citizens were "created" who have no voting representation, no presidential vote, and no clout within the U. S. government. Puerto Rico's only post in Congress is an elected Resident Commissioner who sits in the House of Representatives with the power to speak, but not to vote. This predicament, in part, justifies their claims of treatment as "second-class citizens." On the other hand, as U. S. citizens, Puerto Ricans are entitled to common defense, social security, food stamps and other various transfer payments, although they do not receive the benefits in the same proportion as stateside citizens. Yet Puerto Rico contributes nothing to the federal treasury, for if it did, it would constitute taxation without representation. It seems evident that the granting of U. S. citizenship in 1917 implies Congress's intentions for eventual statehood for Puerto Rico as the only way out of such an ironic situation.
Why is Puerto Rico not yet a state? To respond to this question, an examination of the Constitutional and legal aspects of admitting states is appropriate. Article IV, Section 3 of the U. S. Constitution "empowers Congress with the general authority to admit new states into the Union and to ordain, administer, and dispose of national territory and property." Thus, Congress has the sole discretion to admit or deny admission, to act quickly or to delay admission to any prospective state, working within their vested powers. However, Congress cannot coerce a territory to become a state. The Tenth Amendment guarantees that the free will of the people of the territory will determine their action. The only other Constitutional parameters for the admission of states are (1) that a state cannot be formed out of another state unless the "mother" state gives its consent; (2) that a state cannot be formed out of the joining of two or more states unless all states involved are willing; (3) that citizens of the territory have exclusive right to self-determination; and (4) that new states must be admitted under the same terms and conditions as other states. By these requirements, there is nothing to "bar, foreclose, or restrict in any way the admission of Puerto Rico as the 51st state of the Union." It seems that the founding fathers left the issue of additional states very much open to interpretation, rather like their treatment of the slavery issue.
In practice, there are three additional prerequisites of statehood, as outlined by Thomas Jefferson in the Northwest Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787. Jefferson defined these conditions as the following: '1. That the inhabitants of the proposed new States are imbued with and sympathetic toward the principle of democracy as exemplified in the American form of government; 2. That a majority of the electorate desire [sic ] statehood; and 3. That the proposed new State has sufficient population and resources to support a State government.' The above guidelines are the extent of the Constitutional and commonly accepted framework for admitting new states. Note that there are no cultural or linguistic requirements, nor status requirement (such as incorporation as a territory). Once a prospective state meets these prerequisites, it seems to be a matter of interpretation regarding the next step. Indeed, the prerequisites are a matter of interpretation themselves.
Estadistas argue that Puerto Rico has demonstrated the capacity for stable democratic self-rule ever since 1900. They believe that Puerto Ricans "have integrated and adopted the fundamental libertarian and egalitarian values of the American Constitution." Opponents might reply that Puerto Rico has never been fully autonomous, and has a history of corruption and a committment to power politics rather than social equality. However, compared to the rest of Latin America, Puerto Rico is one of the few places where violence during and after an election is extremely rare. Estadistas also argue that,

. . . notwithstanding its burdensome colonial background and its modest economic
development (when compared to the standards of the United States), Puerto Rico
counts enough population and resources not only to support an efficient state
government but also to proportionally [sic ] contribute to the general welfare of
the nation in terms of the Union's collective security and defense, democratic
experience, manpower resources, reliable markets, natural resources, monetary
wealth, and pluralist cultural and ethnic heritage.
Defining what constitutes a majority is perhaps the most debated prerequisite of all. While some argue that a simple majority of 51% is all that is necessary, others claim that the proportion would have to be at least two-thirds, or even as high as 80 to 90%. Traditionally, however, Congress has been compelled to admit prospective states who petition with solid majorities registered in the 60% range. Furthermore, Congress has never required this majority to be sustained over an indefinite period of time.
The argument can also be made that the Constitution implies that Congress merely consents to the admission of states; the real authority in gaining admission to the Union comes from the people who are seeking admission. Self-determination, after all, is what formed the original 13 states. This principle has been manifested in the so-called Tennessee Plan. This plan refers to the nine states, beginning with Tennessee in 1795. Tired of waiting for Congress to admit them after petitioning for admission with a solid majority, the people of Tennessee unilaterally held their own constitutional convention, passed a state constitution, elected two senators and the requisite number of representatives, and sent these delegates to Washington to assume their proper places in Congress. A courageous act, it has always worked. Less than three months later, Tennessee was admitted as a state. Since then, six other states have successfully adopted this strategy: Michigan (1837); Iowa (1846); California (1850); Oregon (1859); Kansas (1861); and Alaska (1959). The plan has been suggested for Puerto Rico, should the Puerto Rican electorate decide in favor of statehood, as a swift and aggressive means to end the status stalemate.
Last, the Constitutional requirement that new states be admitted under the same terms and conditions as existing states -- the equal footing doctrine -- can be temporarily circumvented. Past experience has shown that Congress has granted new states diverse measures of economic aid as part of the state's enabling act. Land grants, extensive boundary lines, extended maritime jurisdiction, financial aid, and partial exemption from federal taxes are among the concessions that have been used in the past. The practice seems to be for equal footing eventually, but not immediately. Ironically, one of the strongest reasons that Puerto Ricans seek statehood is for equal footing with the other states; that is, equal representation in Congress, equal treatment in transfer payments, and so forth. Estadistas argue that economic concessions will be necessary in Puerto Rico's enabling act because the links of dependency upon the United States were forged long ago -- before Commonwealth -- and are so strong that the U. S. cannot expect Puerto Rico to stand on its own overnight. Rather, they feel that concessions can and must be made to help Puerto Rico out of its parasitic dependency. Thus, the main legal question in the quest for statehood is not what type of statehood will be granted, but what type of Enabling Act can be formulated to foster Puerto Rico's smooth transition to statehood.








See Truman Clark, Puerto Rico and the United States, 1917-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), p. 175, and Jorge Heine, Time for Decision: The United States and Puerto Rico (Lanham, MD: North-South Publishing Co., 1983), p. v.

2 Heine and García-Passalacqua, pp. 58-59. It should be noted that the specific reasons for the opposition to the bills were not given; the reasons may have been well-founded, or arbitrary. Either way, the lack of progress on bills intended to determine Puerto Rico's status in Congress is resented by Puerto Ricans.

See People's Press Puerto Rico Project: Lincoln Bergman et al. Puerto Rico: The Flame of Resistance (San Francisco: People's Press, 1977), p. 35, for instance.

Clark, p. 174.

Frederico Ribes Tovar, A Chronology of Puerto Rican History (New York: Plus Ultra Educational Publishers, 1973), pp. 407, 441-444.

Gil, p. 77.

Carey McWilliams, "Puerto Rico: Plebiscite for Identity," The Nation , 195 (September 15, 1962), 127.

Heine, p. 18.

See Antonia Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13, 1974, pp. 6, 25.

For an explanation of Albizu's philosophy, see ibid., and Carr, p. 170.

Carr, p. 243.

Robert Anderson, Party Politics in Puerto Rico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 48, 80.

Statistics cited in Heine and García-Passalacqua, p. 27.

As printed in the Congressional Record, June 1, 1936, p. 8564. Opinion is that of Felipo L. De Hostos.

Juan José Osuna, A History of Education in Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1949, p. 262.

Anderson, p. 16.

In his Tax Reform message of 1985, President Reagan referred to Puerto Rico as a possession, not Commonwealth, on five separate occassions. See Marco A. Rigau and Juan M. García-Passalacqua, eds., Republica Asociada y Libre Asociacion: Documentación de un Debate (San Juan: Editorial Atlantico, Inc., 1987), p. 177.

See Perusse, p. 148.

United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico (STACOM), Status of Puerto Rico: Selected Background Studies Prepared for the United States-Puerto Rico Commission on the Status of Puerto Rico (New York: Arno Press, 1975), p. 64. Secretary of War Elihu Root stated of the Insular Cases in 1900: 'Ye-es, . . . as near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag -- but doesn't quite catch up with it.' (Wiebe, p. 229.)

See Carr, p. 36, for a discussion.

Roger Bell, Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984), p. 284-85. The figures in parentheses following these states indicate the number of years between the initial application for statehood and the territory's admission: Utah (46); New Mexico (62); Arizona (40); Alaska (14); and Hawaii (19). See Grupo de Investigadores Puertorriqueños, pp. 1276-80.

See Rubén Berríos Martínez, "Independence for Puerto Rico: The OnlySolution," Foreign Affairs, 55 (April, 1977): 567.

The San Juan Star (STAR) , February 27, 1987, 32.

Personal interview with Ferré, December 7, 1987. Ferré was the one who insisted on this wording, knowing that the estadistas hopes for statehood would be dashed otherwise. See Perusse's discussion, p. 5.

Heine, pp. 239-40.

Ibid., pp. 256-57.

Cited in Grupo de Investigadores Puertorriqueños, p. 1455.

Heine, p. 258.

See Operations and Policy Research, Inc., Washington D. C., Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems. Puerto Rico Election Factbook November 5, 1968 (Washington, D. C: 1968), p. 34.

Heine, p. 258. Although these claims cannot be fully substantiated, they are reflective of the sentiment among many estadistas.

STACOM suggested that an electoral majority of 80 to 90% in favor of statehood would be required for admission to the Union. For a complete discussion, see Grupo de Investigadores Puertorriqueños, p. 1371.

See ibid., pp. 1448-53.

Heine, p. 245-49; 258-59.

This argument is explained by Carr, pp. 402-03.

Luis A. Ferré stressed this point in interview, December 7, 1987.
in 1952 recognized Puerto Rico as part of the U. S. Ling for Congress to admit them after petitioning for admission with a solid majority, the pe lected two senators and t in Congress. Less than three months later, Tennessee was admitted as a state. Since then, six other states have...