Author: William D. Pawley & Richard R. Tryon
Chapter Twenty-five
WE SNATCH DEFEAT FROM VICTORY IN VIETNAM
1
One of the most unspeakably tragic circumstances of the war in Vietnam was the fact that twice victory was within the grasp of our American forces, and twice that victory was discarded. Once it was President Johnson, a Democrat, who failed to demand surrender of the enemy, when surrender was all the Red enemy had left - - except to hope that the United States leadership was still drowning in its own fear and stupidity. Again it was President Nixon, a Republican, who turned his back upon victory when very little more effort, well directed by air and naval action, would have gained it.
In both instances, a combination of ignorance and fear tipped the balance in favor of our defeat. The ignorance sprang from a lack of understanding of the intentions - or lack of intentions - of the backers of the North Vietnamese aggressors, Communist China and the Soviet Union, to enter the war with military forces of their own. Add to this the policies of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, which held to the fantasy that the Reds could be “negotiated” into an agreement they would honor - a reasonable agreement, of course, based upon “mutual trust” such as results from traditional striped-pants diplomacy.
Our first failure to recognize that we could have ended the war with a victory for the Free World was when their “Tet Offensive” failed in February-March 1968.
On January 30th of that year, at the beginning of the observance of the Oriental Lunar New Year, the armies of the North Vietnamese, invaders from the North, and the Vietcong insurgents in the South, combined for a do-or-die attempt to win the war with a massive attack upon South Vietnamese cities and towns. Instructions issued by the Red commanders to their military units, captured by American and Allied forces before the offensive began, gave full information on the offensive. The Red troops were ordered to conduct attacks against every city and town in South Vietnam, sometimes down to the village level, forty-two in number. The Red troops were assured by propaganda leaflets that the campaign would certainly be successful, because from its beginning the populace of South Vietnam - the workers, peasants, even business people would rise up and join their “liberators”. The Americans and their “running dogs”, the South Vietnamese forces, would be overcome by the power of the attackers, and one after another of the cities and towns would fall under the control of the patriotic “people’s armies” - so the attackers were told. The American forces, meanwhile, were reluctant to believe that such a coordinated attack would be made at the beginning of Tet.
“Surely, this will not happen at a time traditionally a period of peace and celebration,” was the typical American appraisal of the forecasts.
With the hindsight of events, one must be struck with the consistency of the Communist aggressors. “A period of peace and celebration?” That was precisely the reason for staging the offensive at that time. When the South Vietnamese people joined their North Vietnamese brothers to expel the Americans, there would be peace throughout the land and a big celebration to add to the usual celebration of a religious nature.
Every weapon available to the Reds, from both China and the Soviet Union, was thrown into the grand Tet Offensive. Their cannon leveled great areas of Saigon and other towns, from Hue in the North to the Mekong Delta in the South. Their Russian “Migs” bombed and strafed for hours each day. Many South Vietnamese defenders were executed as soon as they were captured. Families were chased from their homes and their houses burned.
For three weeks the American casualties rose to the highest figures of the entire war - an average of about 1,800 a week - killed and twice that number wounded or missing. The military hospitals, staffed for the most part by American medics, overflowed. Hurriedly constructed pine boxes, filled with the corpses of the American dead, were stacked up in long and high rows at Ton San Nhut airport, waiting to be flown to home area burial grounds.
A picked platoon of about twenty North Vietnamese soldiers attacked the stone wall surrounding the American Embassy, blew a hole twenty-five feet in that wall and rushed though the opening. Half a dozen of the Red soldiers got inside the Embassy building. U.S. Marines, augmenting the regular Embassy guards, shot down all the attackers.
And did the people rise up to join the Red aggressors? They did not. In every area under attack, the local citizens refused to help the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. In most instances, any weapons the people had were turned upon the attackers.
By late February, the Tet Offensive was over. It had failed in its purpose. The aggressors had destroyed business blocks, homes and public facilities everywhere, but they could not hold what they had taken and they retreated in defeat.
At that moment, the war was over. The South Vietnamese and their American backers had not won, but the Reds had lost. All that was needed at that time was for the President of the United States to announce:
“All restraints on our military forces are now removed. Our forces, of all branches, are free to retaliate with every conventional weapon in our arsenal. I call upon the Communist aggressors in both North and South Vietnam to surrender at once, or within forty-eight hours Hanoi, Haiphong, and all your war- making capacity will be bombed off the map.
Among the officers and men of our commands in Vietnam at the time, opinion was practically unanimous that the Reds would have surrendered, provided we began the moves to back up the President’s ultimatum. But that firm statement, and decisive action, never occurred. Instead, President Johnson in March issued another of those astonishing orders that the bombing in Vietnam would be halted. He coupled that with the announcement that he did not intend to run again for President. Here was clear notice to our enemies that American leadership, on the eve of victory, was willing to phase out our part of the war and let the Reds take over at their convenience.
2
In November 1968 Richard M. Nixon was elected President. His public promises included a forthright statement of his intention to end the war in Vietnam “with honor”, and with our objective of a free Republic of Vietnam realized.
Nixon never understood what every officer and G.I. in the war saw clearly, that without military defeat of the enemy, there could be no end to the war “with honor” nor attainment of the objective of a free Vietnam.
That bombing halt ordered by President Johnson - with the consent of the State and Defense Departments - was the ninth such favor given the Reds since American involvement in 1963. In each instance, stopping the bombing was made against the advice of our Air Force, from generals to pilots and down to mechanics. Every time we stopped the bombing, presumably to show our “good faith” in the Reds’ intentions to become discouraged and negotiate an end to the war, we displayed only our ignorance of the Communists’ true aims to continue the fighting until their own victory. In each instance, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong regrouped in their sanctuaries and along the DMZ, refreshed and ready to resume the battle with new vigor and new weapons from their Red Chinese and Soviet Union suppliers.
Instead of making good on his promise, President Nixon followed the futile course of his predecessors. He walked hopefully and starry-eyed into the trap of appeasement and detente, led by the advice of Dr. Kissinger, at first his mentor on foreign relations and then his Secretary of State and chairman of the National Security Council, to make the historic trips to the “People’s Republic of China” and to Moscow.
Students on many campuses were rioting to stop war, and shouting “Hell no, we won’t go!” The liberal press was sparkling with denunciations of the “immoral war in Vietnam”. Members of Congress, always watching to see which way the crowd of voters back home might be moving, hurried to get in front of them. Congressman Paul McCloskey, Jr., for example, made an infamous proposal. He declared that if he were advising the Hanoi regime on how to end the American bombing, he would suggest that they place a captured American soldier in the heart of every town in North Vietnam, so our airmen would not bomb the place. And this was said despite the inhumanity of the weird idea, plus the fact that our nation has agreed to the principle of international law that prisoners of war cannot be used for or against combat action!
It is true that the American people were fed up with the Vietnam war. But actually they were fed up to the eyes with the no-win war. They wanted no more killing just for killing’s sake - no more needless sacrifice of good American servicemen in a lost cause.
3
Sensing their glorious opportunity, the Reds “consented” to send representatives to a “peace conference” to be held - not in Saigon or Hanoi to receive their surrender, but in lovely Paris to show to the world their victory. It was the greatest opportunity ever given a Communist regime to achieve the status of equality, or superiority, with the defeated “imperialists”, the once-great United States of America.
The farce began with the presence of two representatives of the Red side, those for the North Vietnamese and those for the Vietcong. North Vietnam had never admitted, through the long years of their armed combat in the war, that any of their troops were fighting in South Vietnam: all were insurgents of South Vietnam. Even at the peace conference thy were permitted to get away with this falsity, perhaps the best known Big Lie in history. Representing the “imperialist” were the South Vietnamese and the United States of America.
Nearly two months were spent in a debate unworthy of a kindergarten, a demand by the Reds that the shape of the negotiating table not indicate that they were not of equal status with their opposite numbers. That set the pattern for the conduct of the Communist side through the entire two years of the negotiations: Equality at least, and superiority if possible for the arrogant Reds.
Madame Nhu, representing a government “in exile” for South Vietnam, shrilly repeated Marxist slogans and propaganda, while the spokesmen for the United States and for the government of President Thieu begged for an agreement that would give the Republic of Vietnam a chance to survive. At each day’s end there was a television report to the anxious and waiting world, at which the Communist spokesmen would say in obvious confidence that they were “making progress”. The “other side” would reply lamely that “some progress is being made and the progress is continuing.” Progress was indeed being made - by the Reds. As always, they knew that Time moved to favor their side.
We remember that the Communist leaders of North Korea showed no disposition to hurry an agreement to end the war until President Eisenhower threatened them with renewed and forceful military action. So the Communist leaders of North Vietnam dawdled along in the Peace Conference in Paris. They enjoyed their daily chance for propaganda statements and their steadily mounting prestige, until in May 1972 Nixon ordered the mining of Haiphong harbor with torpedoes and the bombing of the border area of Cambodia which was used for so long as a Red sanctuary, which action he should have taken, in my opinion, the day he took office.
These actions were deplored with much hand-wringing and breast-beating by the radical-liberal press and professors, joined by genuine subversives who had been hoping all the time that the Communists would win. But this military pressure got results. The Paris peace talks came alive, with the Communist side willing to negotiate in earnest.
At that moment in 1972, victory for the forces of freedom was again within sight.
The Reds had expended their war materiel faster than their allies, China and Russia, could supply them without using the Haiphong harbor. They had lost men at a fearful rate. All that was needed to end the war was for President Nixon to announce to the Red aggressors, and to all the world, that America was fed up with the stalling tactics of our enemies in Vietnam and Paris and that the full force of American bombing and naval action would be employed to end the war within a few days.
But no ultimatum was given. Even when Nixon was re-elected by the largest electoral percentage in recent history, and had in his hands the prestige of the backing of a big majority of the American people, he bowed to the howls of anguish of the radicals and caved in to their demands that we get out of Vietnam and stop meddling in that “civil war” - right now.
The Reds began to negotiate in earnest, but with the full intention to take advantage of the steadily weakening position of the United States. The big concession offered by the Reds was to release the American prisoners, in return for which they would sign an agreement that would leave their war-making power in South Vietnam virtually intact.
This proposal sparked a big response in Congress. A caucus of Senate Democrats passed a resolution “disapproving the escalation of the war” by Nixon, and recommending a cut-off of funds for any further military action in Vietnam. In a news conference on May 9, 1972, Dr. Kissinger said:
“What is it that we are asking of the North Vietnamese? What is it in those proposals that a country cannot honorably accept? We are saying that if our prisoners are returned, and if there is an end to the fighting, we will withdraw all our forces from South Vietnam and that we will stop all acts of force throughout all Indochina.”3
The Reds snapped up this bargain. They were glad to be relieved of the American prisoners in exchange for all Indochina! So the official Agreement was made. Most important to the Communists of North Vietnam and their backers, not only because it gave them assurance of final victory but also because it meant humiliation for “imperialist America”, was this Article No. 5:
“Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war materiel of the United States and those of other foreign countries...Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.”
This article was nailed down by another which declared: “The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.”
In plain words, “Americans, get out and stay out!” This item was the supreme objective of the aggressors. There was no provision for the North Vietnamese forces to get out of South Vietnam. The Red negotiators still maintained, with sweet smiles, the Big Lie that there never were any of their troops down there, anyhow.
Of course there were some statements like “The South Vietnam people’s right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries. The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.” The true translation of “self determination” meant that the people of South Vietnam, once the Americans were out and the Agreement had been thrown in the wastebasket, would have the right only to do as their new Communist conquerors ordered.
There were items in the Agreement such as this gem: “The two South Vietnamese parties (the Vietcong and the Republic of Vietnam) undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid armed conflict.”
To be sure, the agreement mentioned “democracy” and “democratic liberties” several times. One such section said: “the two South Vietnamese parties will ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press,” and a basketful of other freedoms, not one of which exists in any Communist country and not one of which exists in Vietnam under the Reds today. Such words should have fooled no one, for they were used with the same meaning as “Democratic Republic of Vietnam”, and similar designations.
There was a provision for a “Four Party Joint Military Commission”, which would supervise enforcement of the Agreement. Of course all decisions of the Commission would have to be unanimous, which meant that the Communist members could veto any move made by their opposite numbers and thus render the group powerless.
Realizing full well the implications of the Agreement for his country, President Nguyen Van Thieu refused to go along with the colossal deception. Dr. Kissinger brought him into line with the dark hint that Thieu would have to go it alone if he balked at the Agreement.
On January 27, 1973, the cease-fire accord was signed in Paris. Soon the prisoners of war began arriving in the United States, to be united with their families and their communities. The Communists kept back a trump cared - the names and conditions of the Americans missing-in-action. Information on these just might be revealed later, the Red dictators explained, provided the Americans observed all items of the “Peace Accord”.
4
For his efforts in shaping the Vietnam “peace”, Dr. Kissinger, promoted to Secretary of State, was awarded co-winner of the Nobel Peace prize. The other man sharing this high honor was none other than Le Duc Tho, leader of the Communist negotiators - a circumstance not lost upon people the world over who knew a genuine peace from a false one.
Before the American military personnel were all out of Vietnam, the Reds began to violate the provisions of the agreement. By early 1975 the end of the struggle was in sight. Realizing they were betrayed and abandoned by the Americans, the South Vietnam forces caved in. By April they were fleeing the battlefields. President Ford urged Congress to grant him another appropriation to stem the tide of defeat, but the request was spurned. On April 27th the debacle ended with the lowering of the American flag in disgrace.
Failure to turn on our full power for victory from 1963 to the Tet Offensive cost the United States 25,000 killed and about 90,000 wounded or missing in action. Failure to grasp victory from the Tet Offensive until the peace conference was begun in Paris in early 1971 cost about 20,000 killed and 30,000 wounded or missing. Failure to end the war promptly and decisively while the dismal farcical peace talks dragged on brought the total up to 57,000 killed and about 150,000 wounded or missing. The cost in money and material resources totaled about $150 billion. The cost in moral and spiritual values, plus the loss of credibility and prestige of the United States of America, cannot be measured in money, now or ever.
Let me repeat: The only reason to relate the sad facts of our defeat in Vietnam is to learn from our mistakes, and with a united voice to resolve that they must not happen again. As General William C. Westmoreland, who bore so much of the burden of ground-war battles in the conflict, has said in his book “A Soldier Reports”:5
We couldn’t sweep Vietnam under the rug like a chapter in history that we can’t be proud of. We must look at it to learn our errors. After all, five Presidents and Congress were involved in this. I’m not advocating a witch-hunt, but an objective analysis.”
General Westmoreland discusses our failure - or refusal - to take advantage of the enemy’s weaknesses: “press and television created an aura not of victory, but of defeat, which coupled with the vocal anti-War elements profoundly influenced timid officials in Washington. It was like watching two boxers in a ring, one having the other on the ropes, close to a knockout, when the apparent winner’s second inexplicably throws in the towel.”
What, then, are the great lessons that should be learned by the officials, civilian and military, and the people, young and mature, of the United States with respect to our involvement in Vietnam?
The greatest lesson to be learned was eloquently expressed recently by representatives of the Combined National Veterans Association, made up of 21 outstanding organizations of military veterans from World War I to those of Vietnam, in Washington, D.C. In a resolution which sternly took to task those who claim that with all the personnel we sent into the Vietnam conflict, American forces were not able to win that war, the resolution declared:
“We pledge in behalf of all those, living and dead, who took the part of the United States and our allies in the Vietnam War, to make it clear that they did not lose that war because of any lack of human courage or love of liberty, but rather because of restrictions placed upon their military actions that made it impossible to win a victory, although the ways and means were at hand to do so.
“We pledge to expose the specific rules and regulations that impeded and finally strangled the efforts of the United States fighting forces to attain the objective of preventing the victory of the aggressors in Vietnam; to indicate for the record those who must bear the blame for initiating and enforcing the tragic and unjust restrictions against the efforts of the military forces of this country, that resulted in such great loss of lives, in expenditures of money and resources, and in final defeat.
“We further pledge to make clear the one lesson we hope our nation, our leaders and our people, can and should learn from the defeat in Vietnam, namely: That never again, in all future history, should military forces of the United States be sent into any war unless they are given full assurance, and such assurance given their families, and to the people generally, that they can and will win a victory over aggression as speedily and completely as possible.”
I say that if this most important lesson has not been learned, and our civilian officials ever again try to send our young men into the combat of a “limited war”, with or without the approval of Congress, the people of this country should rise up in vigorous rebellion. If ever again our youth are drafted or enrolled to fight under the restrictions that held them from victory in Korea and Indochina, then the 57,000 who gave their lives for freedom in Vietnam have died in vain; and all those wounded and missing, and their families, have been forced to suffer in vain; and all the expenditures of Korea and Vietnam have been wasted in the sinkholes of ignorance and fear.
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