Why the Communists are Winning as of 1976...

Author: William D. Pawley & Richard R. Tryon

Chapter Twenty-one
PLANNING THE INVASION OF CUBA
After all these years, I still find it hard to hold down my blood pressure as I write this story - a story that might not, and should not, have ever been written into our national history: It is the second loss of Cuba to Communism.
Chief cause of the loss? General cause - timidity and fear instead of the needed courage and decisive action.
Immediate cause of the loss:A single fateful telephone call!
I do not consider Cuba an “oft-told tale,” better left unrepeated. The tale cannot be told often enough, and must be kept fresh in our memories, if we ever hope to avoid similar blunders elsewhere.
At about the same time early in 1960 that Eisenhower had approached me about undertaking negotiations with Trujillo, he also consulted me about the need for pursuing some viable plan to rid Cuba of Castro, in the best interests of both of our countries.
“I now recognize, Bill,” he confessed, “that I should have listened harder to your repeated advice earlier, and acted on it. But that’s over the dam. I’m now ready for decisive action. I’ve already authorized Allen Dulles to confer with the leaders of the exiled Cubans who wish to undertake the overthrow of the Castro Communist regime.”
My pulse began racing faster as he continued:
“With our support, these patriots are to be welded into a small but powerful military force capable of overthrowing the Castro dictatorship.” He paused, then fixed those steady eyes on mine. “Bill,” he said, “I want you to assist the CIA in getting the job done right - in the recruitment, supply and organization of this operation. You can function from your office in Miami.”
The President went on to explain that he had always worked through a staff and that, in this case, he would operate through and rely on his Secretary of State, Christian Herter.
I accepted on the spot, despite many misgivings. Foremost among these was Ike’s decision to make the venture the responsibility of the Secretary of State. I did not believe that Secretary Herter had the initiative and courage to see this project through. He was becoming more and more handicapped by a crippling illness, and was relying to an increasing extent upon Under Secretary Dillon. I was sure that Dillon would have no stomach to rid Cuba of Castro.
I believed that an operation in so sensitive an area should be delegated to a personal representative of the President, who would have access to him at all times, and be armed with White House authority to cut through bureaucratic obstructions, eliminate bottlenecks, and ensure the cooperation of all parties in expert planning and execution. Certainly, just such a procedure had proved conspicuously successful in the Guatemalan operation.
I could see a fatal flaw in the assignment of the mission to the CIA. Allen Dulles, as director, already had his hands full with CIA’s dual function of collecting and digesting intelligence, while carrying on worldwide operations. I was sure this would happen: Dulles could be expected to turn this specific task over to Richard Bissell or Frank Wisner, in charge of directing global, covert operations. These overburdened individuals would, in turn, delegate the job to someone still lower in the hierarchy. No matter how able, an official so placed would lack the muscle to get needed action from the powerful heads of other agencies, let alone reach the President.
Since the President’s decision was already in force, I held my peace. The crucial point was that, better late than never, the President was acting. I was willing to go along with what I considered a defective organizational setup rather than press for drastic changes at the last moment. As they say in the aerospace industry, “Don’t try to improve it to the point where it won’t work!”
2
One nagging mental reservation did compel me to return to Eisenhower for another try at the removal of Wieland from his present position, if any plan for the liberation of Cuba was to have a chance. Once again, he set up a conference for me with Douglas Dillon, recently promoted to Under Secretary of State. I cherished hopes that Dillon would not be blinded to the evidence. And I believed that, as an official who had not been directly concerned with Cuba, he would not feel personally threatened by the elimination of an unsuitable or untrustworthy subordinate.
Guarding against a distorted interpretation of my meeting with Dillon by other officials at State, I asked the President for permission to invite Senator Smathers to go with me. I wanted him to repeat his experience with the outspoken Marine officer in Haiti, which had convinced him that William Arthur Wieland was a sorry excuse for a representative of our country.
We met in May with Dillon and Rubottom’s deputy, former Ambassador Lester DeWitt Mallory. After the formalities, I was extremely frank:
“Gentlemen, I have the unpleasant duty to tell you something that you may not like. I have serious misgivings about the wisdom of retaining William Wieland in his present job. His close association with Herbert Matthews of The New York Times, and his activities with respect to Cuba, are sufficient reason for his transfer. Better still, he should have been fired long ago.”
I followed up with pertinent background, beginning with the Bogotazo and Wieland’s firsthand exposure to Castro in his true Red colors, then passed the baton to Smathers, who stated his complaint cogently.
“What do you recommend?” Dillon asked, turning to Mallory, who seemed to be boiling with indignation.
“Pawley,” he exclaimed, “I’ve never seen such outside pressure put on a foreign service officer as I’ve just heard from you!” Should I have been prepared to make a change, I wouldn’t even consider it now!”
“Do you mean to tell me,” I retorted heatedly, “That you can call this outside pressure? George Smathers is an elected United States Senator, and I worked in this Department for five and a half years. All we’re trying to do is be helpful to you gentlemen and to our country. I can’t believe you’re serious.”
If anything, my emotions were stronger than my words. It shook me up that highly placed officials could act on the tacit principle that defending their clique against so-called outside interference transcended an obligation to protect the security of America.
If Mallory had made an investigation of Wieland, he would have discovered, as a Senate investigation committee later concluded, that “he was appointed without any security check...he falsified his job application by omission” and “when he later filled out an expanded personal history form, he falsified that by direct misstatement..
This was entirely apart from the evidence that Wieland apparently knew that Castro was a Communist, but did everything possible to mislead his superiors, maneuvering with steadfast cunning to foist Castro’s malevolent regime on the Cuban people.
At a time when the State Department was directly engaged in a top-secret presidential plan for Cuba’s liberation, it was of crucial importance that officials who served as apologists for Castro be weeded out. It was already on the record that Wieland had successfully blocked the delivery of the $10 million worth of military supplies ordered and paid for by the Batista regime, while corresponding millions worth of munitions were reaching Castro through Florida, Alabama and Louisiana.
Our meeting, alternately frigid and hot, terminated on a disturbing note when Douglas Dillon fatuously observed:
“Castro isn’t the one I’m worried about. It’s Trujillo. I’ll be attending a conference in Central America where I’m going to do my best to get him censured.”
Accepting the futility of further discussion, Smathers and I took our leave with heavy hearts. But I hasten in fairness to add that I have never assumed that either Dillon or Mallory were guilty of anything worse than bad judgment and unwillingness to examine the facts.
3
Back in 1958, as Castro’s place in the sun was emerging, CIA Director Allen Dulles had finally reported to the President that “Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement,” adding, “if Castro takes power, they will probably participate in the government.”
In his memoirs, Eisenhower mildly observed that he was “provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier.”
Ike had, of course, been warned much earlier. In addition to my own efforts on many occasions to open his eyes to the true character of Fidel Castro and his movement, Gonzalo Guell, Batista’s Foreign Minister, had personally informed Eisenhower, Dulles and Rubottom that Castro was a Communist and had submitted evidence of these connections to the State Department, the FBI and the CIA.
Ike had shied away from these warnings as suspect because they originated with people who favored Batista. The myth that Batista was the devil incarnate and that his ministers followed suit, so diligently propagated by the Reds, must have seeped upward by an insidious process of osmosis which finally closed the mind of the President, despite solid evidence given in good faith by honest Cubans and myself.
In April, 1959, the American Society of Newspaper Editors invited Castro to give a speech at the National Press Club. Castro assured his audience, and all America, that there was no Communist influence on his government.
Vice-President Nixon availed himself of the presence in the United States of the Hero of the Sierra Maestra to interview him in depth for three hours. In a long memo to CIA and State, Nixon gave his conclusion that Castro was “either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline.”
At about the same time, Ike, after reading one of the speeches of Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother, told Allen Dulles that he “must certainly be a Communist.” The White House also learned that “Che” Guevara, Castro’s emissary to spread Communism in Latin America, had told Indian Communists, during his Asian tour, that as soon as they got the United States out of Guantanamo naval base, the Castro Cubans would be able to pursue “their true foreign policy”.
Despite this growing recognition of the real situation and an awakening by the Eisenhower Administration that something must be done, a year of the twenty months of grace remaining in Ike’s tenure had been frittered away in discussion and indecision. Fear of Latin American reaction to unilateral action by Uncle Sam, and the argument that Castro was already a hero of the masses south of the border, stayed the President’s hand. The real facts had been shrouded in the foggy thinking of ultra-liberals, cotton-headed Utopians and radicals, not to mention covert Communists, all continuing to place Castro in the role of a visionary and champion of the common man.
One of the most influential voices in this chorus was that of then Senator John F. Kennedy. In his The Strategy of Peace (January, 1960), Kennedy said: “Castro is part of the legacy of Bolivar.” He blamed “the brutal, bloody, and despotic dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista” for Castro’s triumph, criticized the Eisenhower Administration for having supported Batista “so long and so uncritically” and lamented the fact that the United States had not given “the fiery young rebel a warmer welcome in his hour of triumph.” There was scarcely a word of truth in any of these confident pronouncements.
4
The CIA selected a man to run the Cuban operation, sent him to Miami, and instructed him to see me. I had been asked to cooperate with this individual. I’ll call him “Reinhold”, since his real identity is still classified.
I soon reached the judgment that Reinhold was an extremely able young man, but he was not senior enough for direct access to Dulles or the President. I knew that this was not the kind of mission that could possibly be handled properly through normal channels.
I immediately assembled a group of top Cubans. They would operate out of my office and serve as a staff. They were Dr. Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, Fabio Freyre, Dr. Antonio Maceo, Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla and General Martin Diaz Tamayo.
The fine caliber of this group is hard to exaggerate. We met several times a week for all-day sessions. We stuck to an exhausting schedule for more than a year. Our major tasks were assistance in recruitment, security screening and preparation of the force that was being sent to Guatemala for intensive pre-invasion training.
Eisenhower promised me that we would be going all-out, with no holds barred, with the best of training and equipment and with the support of the U.S. Navy for escort to Cuba. The plan of operations had been prepared by the JCS and had been scrutinized by the President personally and by the CIA.
No commander with Ike’s experience with the role of air power in Hitler’s defeat could overlook the keystone of our plan, which was control of the air over the field of operation. We knew that the few aircraft that comprised Castro’s “Air Force” must be destroyed as a first priority before any attempt was made to land an invasion force. The unloading of supply ships carrying food, munitions, medical supplies and all of the other necessities for the combat force had to be protected.
We knew from U-2 reconnaissance flights exactly where Castro’s aircraft were, and we knew that the best way to eliminate them with hopefully no loss of civilian life was by means of swift precision-bombing and strafing operations by fighter- bombers on the two airfields. If for any reason our aircraft should fail in so elementary a mission, the men would not be put ashore, under any circumstances. This was specifically underscored for me in all of my discussions with the President and the CIA.
We planned to do the job economically with seventeen combat planes and five Sherman tanks, supporting a trained striking force of 3,000 Cuban exiles equipped with the latest infantry weapons available, including bazookas, machine guns, mortars and supporting tanks and artillery. The supply ships were to carry enough equipment to the beaches to arm an additional 15,000 men, on the assumption that the Cuban people would welcome the liberators and that thousands would join their ranks (which turned out to be true). Another seventeen transport planes were to be assigned for prompt resupply of the most essential combat materiel to the invasion troops.
Special communications equipment, one unit of which cost about $100,000, was designed to enable the assailants to establish contact with Miami, Washington, and other control centers quickly and directly.
We planned to provide 150 to 200 Cuban exile pilots with accelerated training as bombardiers and bomber pilots. I signed a contract with the Embry Riddle Flying School to teach these men the techniques they would need. In the time we had at our disposal, however, we learned it would be impossible to turn out competent bomber pilots. When the invasion finally took place, the men who manned the aircraft would be American and Cuban veterans of the Korean War.
We soon encountered a practical difficulty in connection with recruiting. The Cubans had families and we had no means of providing U.S. Government support for their dependents while they were in training in Guatemala or in combat in Cuba. Since they were refugees, even some Cubans from wealthy families were hard-pressed. Fabio Freyre persuaded his family to put up $100,000 and I matched his contribution. Thus we were able to finance the Cuban group of recruits and those working with us in my office.
Fabio Freyre came to the Miami office daily from Palm Beach, where he lived with his wife and eight children, to concentrate on recruiting and other problems. One day, in March, 1961, he told me that he had persuaded his family to agree to his volunteering for training and combat. He pressured me to allow him to go to the Opa-Locka airfield, which was being used for transit to and from the training area, and to fly to the Guatemala camp on the next available airplane.
I tried my best to talk him out of it, arguing that he was already making an enormous contribution where he was, without jeopardizing the breadwinner for so large a family. I stalled him off for another day by inviting him to our house for dinner that evening. On the phone to Allen Dulles after dinner, I told him about Fabio’s determination to transfer to Guatemala for combat training, and why I had vigorously opposed it. To my surprise, he answered without hesitation:
“Look at it this way, Bill. Fabio is a Cuban. A patriot. I think very highly of him. We are taking every possible precaution for everyone’s safety. If everything goes as briefed, the risks will be minimal. If he insists that he wants to share the same risks with the friends he has recruited, I think he has a point. Since he has the blessing of his family, why don’t you put him on that plane and wish him luck?”
5
With lingering misgivings, I saw Fabio off at the airport and bade him godspeed. My misgivings were to prove well founded.
Fabio wrote me a cheerful letter from Guatemala a week later: (Received after he was a prisoner in the Isle of Pines).
“The training is wonderful; we are kept busy constantly, and even though I am 42 now and have not exercised much in the past two and a half years, I am taking it well, and I don’t feel as stiff and rusty as in the first few days. The food is very healthy and in quantity. The life is very rough, but of course it had to be expected. This is necessary to have the people in good shape and ready for the worst.
“The professors are wonderful and they work with us. Mine is a very friendly and likable person. The morale is tops. The boys are awfully eager to be given the break to prove their know-how. I must admit that I am very happy and that I do not regret to add this new experience to my short life. I deeply believe that I am being given the opportunity to serve my country in its hours of greatest grief.”
Delays continued to plague the operation. The obstacles seemed to me of a petty and avoidable nature. For example, State people would tell Reinhold to go to one of the three Central American Republics concerned to obtain a document from the President, promising that he would not hold the United States financially liable for loss of property caused by training or logistical operations. The fact that this was already clearly understood, or that the possible American cash outlay was picayune, never seemed to deter State Department to neglect essentials, while somebody hurried off to Central America to secure unnecessary assurances which had already been given.
Time being of the essence, near the end of the President’s term I flew up to see him frequently to protest the manner in which the entire undertaking was being mired in red tape and easily avoidable delays. He was greatly disturbed and repeated to me:
“Bill, I’m absolutely determined to see this thing through before my term expires.”
He called in the three top officials concerned, Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates and Allen Dulles and asked them what was wrong. My good friend Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, who had no responsibility for the operation, usually attended also, because of Ike’ high regard for his judgment. Anderson was distressed by my repeated accusations of delay, as he had been assured that the necessary orders were being given to expedite matters. On one occasion, Bob telephoned me at the Mayflower Hotel to complain rather severely that, because of my criticism of delays, Ike had just subjected his three close friends to a tongue-lashing.
Those were difficult days for the President, on top of the serious illnesses which had undermined his vitality, including a near-fatal coronary. I reassured Anderson that I was not accusing Dulles, Gates and Herter of acting in bad faith, but that the static was further down the line, where orders were being carried out sluggishly, evaded or ignored, apparently without the knowledge of the top echelon. I had seen the phenomenon many other times, as in the Brazilian wheat deal.
In the Cuban case, as in the earlier Brazilian fiasco, direct orders were indeed being issued at cabinet level. In the absence of machinery for follow-through, lower echelons were dragging their feet, inventing unnecessary diversions and dreaming up new reasons for procrastination. They doubtless calculated that if they could procrastinate long enough during the preparation phase for the invasion, Eisenhower would be out of office, and Kennedy, if he won, could be persuaded to call the whole deal off. As near as I could tell, the obstructionist activities were centered primarily in the State Department, not in CIA.
The exiles in Miami were united in their burning desire to destroy the Communist stranglehold on Cuba which was visiting such frightful suffering and oppression on their countrymen. Therefore, any politically moderate and trustworthy Cuban would be acceptable, if designated by the White House as their leader. Any statement that specific plans had not been drawn up for a military invasion is simply incorrect.
6
In November, 1960, John F. Kennedy became the President-elect. We redoubled our efforts to destroy a Communist bastion ninety miles from Miami before Eisenhower would be relinquishing the reins on January 20th to a successor whose reaction to our invasion plan was an unknown factor.
I complained to the President about delays for the last time shortly before Christmas. At this interview he asked me if I could arrange a quick trip to Latin America to enlist the assistance of one or more Latin countries. I welcomed the suggestion, since our venture would then become Inter-American rather than unilateral - although the latter was sanctioned by the Rio Mutual Assistance Military Treaty.
“What countries would you suggest, Bill?” he asked.
“President Prado in Peru and President Frondizi in Argentina,” I answered.
“I agree,” Ike said. “Excellent choices. Can you leave right away?”
I hesitated. “But is there enough time, Sir, with the short time you have left?” I asked.
“I can only hope so,” he answered.
I hurried from the President’s office in high spirits that we were now facing the last hurdle. Every other piece in the complex puzzle was in place. We were primed and ready to go. We were magnificently combat-ready. Planes, ships and logistic support were arranged. Supplies were stockpiled to support the beachhead. Plans to set up a provisional government were perfected. Once that government was installed on Cuban soil, however precariously, the United States would give it diplomatic recognition and legally give it the arms purchased by Batista, which it needed to survive.
Passing through Lima, Edna and I met old friends who invited us to spend a week or two. Edna replied that we would see them on our way back from Argentina. Traveling ostensibly as tourists, with no advance notice to anyone, we arrived with no credentials nor papers from the President or anyone else explaining the purpose of the trip.
I ran into Roy Rubottom unexpectedly, while retrieving my luggage at the Buenos Aires airport. He was there to meet his daughter, who was returning home from school for the Christmas holidays. Rubottom had been replaced as assistant secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and had been appointed ambassador to Argentina. He seemed somewhat surprised to see us and asked whether there was anything he could do for me. I shook my head, but when asked if I would like to see President Frondizi, I quickly took him up on it.
That evening the President was at his door to meet me. Dismissing his aides, he ushered me to the ceremonial sofa and sat down beside me. He was already ahead of me.
“Pawley,” he said, “this is the first time I have ever seen your government use what I consider good judgment in conveying a message to a Latin American Chief of State. What usually happens is what occurred when Adlai Stevenson came down here a few weeks ago. He had a lot of assistants and interpreters and was accompanied by newsmen. All conversations were in the open. Both of us felt muzzled. After all, we are politicians. Now, you and I are alone, without any publicity or interpreter. We can be absolutely frank. By the way, I know why you are here.”
“How so, Mr. President?”
“Because some Cubans were down here ten days ago, asking me for help. I am very sympathetic to their problem and almost all of the members of our armed forces are anti-Castro. The Cubans told me of your part in this venture. Now before you explain your mission, I would like to make a few personal observations:
“First, it is inconceivable to me that your Government did not know that Castro was a Communist and that it permitted him to reach power. Second, once you discovered (if you didn’t know it previously) that he was a Communist and a confessed Communist, I find it incomprehensible that you didn’t go into Cuba with the Marines, immediately overthrow him, and establish a provisional government. This would not have been regarded with disfavor in the Western Hemisphere. You would not have been interfering with a valid Latin American government, but would have been acting under the Rio treaty which gives you the right and the duty to get rid of any power from outside that tries to get a foothold in the Americas.
“I know that you are assisting the Cubans and that you have a large group in Guatemala and are getting ready to overthrow Castro. May I make this observation:
“Do not, under any circumstances, put these men ashore unless you are willing to back them up with whatever it takes. A failure would be catastrophic. It would be a loss which you might never recover.”